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INTERNATIONAL

PRC'S ANTI-SOVIET, ANTI-DETENTE COURSE ATTACKED

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in Russian No 10, 1981 pp 76-87

[Article by B. A. Soborov: "The Struggle of the CPSU Against the Imperialist and Inflammatory Policy of Beijing"]

[Text] The Soviet Union has not striven and does not strive for confrontation with the PRC. It is not the Soviet Union which bears the guilt for the fact that Soviet-Chinese relations remain frozen. Having noted that we are following the policy set forth by the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses and would like to establish relations with the PRC on a good-neighbor basis, L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, emphasized in the Report of the Central Committee of the party to the 26th Congress: "Our Proposals aiming at the normalization of relations with China remain in force, as do our feelings of respect and friendship for the Chinese people."¹

Changes are now taking place in the domestic policy of China, the true meaning of which time has yet to show. It will show to what extent the present Chinese leadership will succeed in overcoming the Maoist heritage. "But for the time being one cannot speak of any changes for the better in the foreign policy of Beijing," L. I. Brezhnev pointed out.²

As was noted in the course of the Crimean meetings of L. I. Brezhnev with the leaders of the fraternal parties and countries in July-August 1981, the policy of Beijing is becoming more and more closely linked with the line of imperialism, to which the socialist states oppose a clear and consistent policy of strengthening the peace, curbing and stopping the arms race, and the just settlement of crisis situations at the negotiating table.³

In the opposition of the two world systems, the present Chinese leadership has factually become an active partner of imperialism. It is striving to inflict the maximum damage on the socialist states, regarding them as the main obstacle in the path of the realization of its hegemonist plans; it is betraying the interests of the national liberation movement and all progressive forces. Its policy poses a serious threat to peace throughout the world since the leaders of China are prepared to sacrifice the existence of entire peoples and all of humanity to their hegemonist projects.

The internal situation in China continues to remain complicated and contradictory. There is no slackening in the struggle for power among the different groups in the Chinese top leadership, an indication of which was the recent trial of the "Gang of Four" and a group of military men from the former entourage of Lin Biao and the removal of Hua Guofeng from the post of chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPC in June of 1981. The Chinese economy is experiencing a deep crisis: The budget deficit has become chronic during the past few years; inflation is growing, and mass unemployment continues to exist in the country. The new leadership of the PRC, in trying to overcome the difficult situation, has made certain corrections in the former policy, is rejecting the most odious Maoist goals, and is allowing criticism of Mao Zedong. However, in so doing nobody has called into question Mao Zedong as the former leader and Maoism as the ideological foundation of the present regime. The Sixth Plenum of the CPC Central Committee confirmed the erased "ideas of Mao Zedong" as the official ideology of the party and the state."

The successors of Mao Zedong have professed allegiance to all anti-Marxist foreign policy conceptions of Mao Zedong, in particular to the "theory of the three worlds". This "theory" received official confirmation in the decisions of the Sixth Plenum of the CPC Central Committee.⁴

If one traces the more than thirty-year-long evolution of Maoist foreign policy conceptions, some of its peculiarities are convincingly revealed: First of all, its anti-scientific and subjective character; secondly, its openly reactionary and anti-social essence; thirdly, its hegemonistic orientation.

The Maoist "theoretical" calculations reflect the petty-bourgeois conceptions of Mao Zedong and his followers about the character of the processes in the contemporary world. These postulates are formulated according to the political tasks which the Chinese leaders have set and are setting for themselves. The Maoist "theories" at the same time were profoundly influenced by nonproletarian, including bourgeois views, and the farther the leadership of China deviated from the socialist countries the more noticeable this influence became.

If the theories of "intervening zones", "the encirclement of the cities by the country", and some others that were advanced during the 1940's to the 1960's can still be considered to be the invention of the Maoists themselves, the conception of the "superpowers" and the "theory of the three worlds" to a considerable extent are adoptions from the arsenal of bourgeois political scientists, adapted to the needs of Beijing's policy.

If in the first variant of the conception of "intervening zones" (1946) the Soviet Union was regarded as the only socialist country during that period which "the American reactionaries hate to the extreme and indeed dream of destroying",⁵ the USSR, according to the "theory of the three worlds", was transformed into "an imperialist superpower", "the most dangerous breeding ground of a world war".⁶

The active process of the rapprochement of the Chinese leadership with imperialism during the 1970's also left its imprint on the "theory of the three worlds", having once again demonstrated the reactionary nature of Beijing's "theoretical" schemes and formulas. If during the first half of the 1970s the emphasis in Beijing was

put on the "Third World" as "the great moving force of world history",⁷ in the second half of the same decade. When the West became the basic political and economic partner of China, the accent was shifted to the "broadest international front in the struggle against the Soviet Union", in which the United States was included.

Such a turnabout, reflecting the de facto transition of Beijing to the positions of imperialism demonstrated at the same time the bankruptcy of the calculations of the Chinese leadership in regard to the formation in the international arena of a "third force", which would oppose the two world systems. Life once again confirmed the correctness of the Leninist words about the illusionary nature of such calculations. "One must . . . stand either for this, our, side," wrote Lenin, "or for the other. All attempts to stand neither for the one nor for the other side end in bankruptcy and scandal."⁸

Henceforth the Chinese leaders see their main task in disrupting world socialism and in destroying the bonds of friendship among the fraternal countries. Anti-Sovietism, the struggle against the Soviet Union, occupies the central place in the anti-socialist activity of Beijing. In this connection, the Beijing chauvinists resort to falsifications on a wide scale.

On the one hand, they assert that anti-Sovietism is "a cap" which, they say, the Soviet Union "frequently puts on others".⁹ In actual fact, the Maoists declare, anti-sovietism constitutes "the struggle of the revolutionary peoples of the world against Soviet hegemonism." On the other hand, the Beijing leaders accuse the Soviet Union of being responsible for the worsening of Soviet-Chinese relations although such assertions are refuted by their authors themselves, who are forced to acknowledge that the anti-Soviet policy has deep roots in China and that its sources go back to Mao Zedong.

After the death of Mao Zedong the fifth volume of his "Selected Works" was published in China in 1977, which included previously unpublished works of the "great helmsman". These materials, which are permeated with profound anti-Sovietism, testify to the fact that Mao had nourished hostility toward our country for a long time. Among them one might name, for example, the speech of Mao at the expanded session of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee in April 1956 "On Ten of the Most Important Interrelations", in which the practice of socialist construction in the USSR was distorted in every conceivable way and steeped in dirt, and in which Mao called the experience of the Soviet Union "a warning" for China.¹⁰

On 9 September 1979 RENMIN RIBAO inserted in its pages the previously unpublished text of "a conversation of Mao Zedong with music workers", which took place on 24 August 1956, i. e., at approximately the same time as his above-mentioned speech to the Politburo. In this conversation Mao sharply attacked the "dogmatism", by which he meant studying the example of the Soviet Union.

Mao long ago prepared the CPC and the Chinese people for a break with the Soviet Union. It is not without interest to note, however, that these speeches of his took place literally on the eve of the 8th CPC Congress (September 1956), at which Mao issued a call for "studying the example of the advancing Soviet Union",¹¹ thus demonstrating his hypocrisy.

The inclusion in the fifth volume of the "Selected Works" of Mao Zedong of his speech "On the Ten Most Important Interrelations", as well as the publication of other similar materials in recent times, undoubtedly represent calculated steps. The successors of Mao, regardless of whether they belonged to the "Gang of Four" or not, synonymously took upon themselves the obligation of continuing the chauvinistic, anti-Soviet policy of Mao. This found confirmation, in particular, in the hostile attitude of Beijing to the Soviet-Chinese Agreement.

On 3 April 1979, the PRC government, after having destroyed the good and long-standing traditions of friendly relations between the peoples of the USSR and China, declared that it was not inclined to extend the Agreement on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and the CPR, the thirty-year-term of which expired in April 1980. This one-sided act was a new confirmation of the policy of further complicating and undermining Soviet-Chinese relations conducted systematically by the Chinese leadership.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union continued to pursue consistently the normalization of relations with China. As a result negotiations of state delegations of the USSR and the PRC took place in Moscow from 29 September to 30 November 1979. In the course of the negotiations, the Soviet delegation proposed a draft for a declaration on the principles of interrelations between the Soviet Union and China. Agreement was reached on the continuation of the negotiations in Beijing.¹² However, subsequently the Chinese side under various invented pretexts refused the resumption of the negotiations.

Beijing's clear lack of desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union is evidenced by various "preliminary conditions" advanced by the Chinese leadership, which takes the liberty of crudely interfering in the internal affairs of our country and in its relations with third countries.

The anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese leadership also finds reflection in the unabating slanderous propaganda campaign in China, directed against the USSR. It suffices to say that in one newspaper alone, RENMIN RIBAO, more than 3,400 anti-Soviet materials were published in 1980.

Deng Xiaoping, in a speech before cadre workers of a higher section on 16 January 1980, placed "the struggle against hegemonism", by which he meant the Soviet Union, first among the three "most important tasks" in the 1980's.¹³ The anti-Soviet policy of the Beijing leadership was confirmed at the session of the All-Chinese Assembly of People's Representatives, which took place in August-September 1980, and at the already mentioned Sixth Plenum of the CPC Central Committee. In the decision of the Plenum Mao Zedong was given credit for his struggle against the USSR, which, as previously, was slanderously called a social-imperialist state."¹⁴

The divisive goals of Beijing are served by a so-called "differentiated policy", which finds manifestation in the political, as well as in the economic and ideological spheres. It is connected with a broad collection of tactical methods, beginning with advances and ending with slanderous provocations, and attempts to call forth the manifestation of nationalism in socialist countries. Lately Beijing has begun to put a notable accent on the propagation of various "models of

socialism", singling out in particular its own model. The innermost essence of this is the denial of common regularities in the construction of socialism to the end of counterposing some socialist countries to others.

The differentiated approach also includes the use of extreme methods, such as armed aggression, exemplified by the Chinese aggression against socialist Vietnam in February-March 1979. The attack on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signified a qualitatively new phase in the struggle of the Chinese leadership against socialist countries--the large-scale use of armed forces. This aggression was undertaken in agreement with the imperialists or, as a minimum, with their tacit agreement: The attack was preceded by the trip of Deng Xiaoping to the United States at the end of January 1979.

The aggression of China against Vietnam is an example of the open hegemonism of Beijing, of its great-power aspiration to impose its will on the Vietnamese people. At the time when a Chinese army of half a million men brought down its might on Vietnam, the official Chinese agency Xin Hua, on the instructions of the government of the PRC, hypocritically assured the whole world that China "needs a peaceful international situation", that it "does not want war", that the government of China "values and upholds the friendship of the peoples of China and Vietnam".¹⁵

The two rounds of Vietnamese-Chinese talks that were held initially in Hanoi and then in Beijing showed the true value of Beijing's talk about peace. The talks were transformed by Beijing into a platform for propaganda attacks against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, for the deception of the Chinese and international community, and for the cover of military actions of the PRC in the border regions with Vietnam, which during the past few months have assumed an even more aggressive character. China continues to threaten Vietnam openly, declaring its inclination to teach her "a second lesson". At the same time, the Chinese leaders in every conceivable way justify their predatory action, cynically declaring, as did, for example, Deng Xiaoping at the meeting of 16 January 1980, that the attack on Vietnam "not only contributed to the stabilization of the situation in Southeast Asia, but also played an important role in the international struggle against hegemonism and will still play its role in the future."¹⁶

The Chinese leadership also occupies a double-faced position in the Korean question. In words it demagogically comes out in support of the position of the Democratic Korean People's Republic in regard to the peaceful unification of Korea and the withdrawal of the troops of the United States from South Korea, but in actual fact it acts for the preservation of the American military presence in this region. The partnership with imperialism turns out to be much more important for the Chinese leaders than the interests of the socialist states. In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger, former secretary of state and assistant to the president of the United States, in particular notes such a character of the Beijing position on the Korean question: "China did not insist on the withdrawal of our troops from Korea, although it basically followed the policy line of P'yongyang."¹⁷

In connection with the recent events in Poland, the Beijing leadership again clearly showed on whose side its interests and sympathies lie. Carefully repeating all conjectures of the Western press, and at times outdoing it in slanderous attacks,

Beijing focuses its basic attention on the anti-Soviet fabrications and demonstrates open sympathy with respect to the anti-Soviet forces in Poland.

The anti-Soviet and anti-socialist line is a kind of promissory note for Beijing, for which the imperialist powers are prepared to extend assistance to China, moreover first of all in the development of its military-industrial potential. In this way, the West is attempting to bind Beijing to its own military chariot, so as to have the possibility to exert pressure on it at any moment.

Enumerating their political adversaries, the Chinese leaders as a rule name imperialism among them. However, this is nothing but a masquerade. In actual fact, the imperialist powers are regarded in Beijing as real partners of China in the struggle against the world socialist community, the national liberation movement, and all revolutionary forces.

When at the beginning of the 1970's Beijing embarked upon a policy of rapprochement with imperialism on an anti-Soviet and anti-socialist basis, the Chinese press, attempting to undergird such a turnabout "theoretically", began to talk about a "colossal stratification and a colossal regrouping" supposedly taking place in the international situation.¹⁸ When at the end of the 1970's this process of rapprochement with imperialism developed on a wide scale, people in Beijing went so far as to declare that "a new structure and form have developed in international relations."¹⁹ Such "theorizing" can be assessed only as recurrent attempts to justify the betrayal of the revolutionary forces which Beijing perpetrated. Speaking on 16 January 1980, Deng Xiaoping noted the normalization of relations with the United States, the signing of the Agreement on Peace and Friendship with Japan, and the establishment of relations with the "Common Market" as one of the basic achievements of China in foreign policy.

The Chinese leadership at present openly calls for the creation of a "united front" with imperialism for the struggle against the Soviet Union and the other socialist states.

During recent months, a new conception of the "structure of joint resistance to hegemonism" is being elaborated in the Chinese press--a conception which must be regarded as the "development" of the Beijing idea of the "united front". At a meeting with the delegation of the Japanese newspaper CHUNICHI SHIMBUN on 6 April 1981, Zhao Ziyang, fighting for the creation of a "structure of joint resistance to hegemonism", declared that "the countries of Asia and the Pacific Ocean, the United States and Western Europe, having run into the constantly intensifying aggression and expansion of the Soviet Union, must unite and jointly curb Soviet hegemonism."²⁰

In China people now openly talk and write about the "strategic coordination between China, the United States and Japan."²¹ On 19 July 1981 the news agency Xin Hua, citing the opinion of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former adviser to the president of the United States for national security, who had visited Beijing, that the latter, in a conversation with Deng Xiaoping, "arrived at a common assessment of Chinese-American relations and the strategic situation in the world." Moreover, it was emphasized that at the present time "in point of fact a coalition is being formed between the United States, China, Japan, and Western Europe." "This is objective reality," declared

Brzezinski, "and it must be acknowledged as a new and important event in international relations."

And although no formal alliance has been concluded between China and the United States, nevertheless the military and political cooperation between them is developing steadily. They not only carry out parallel operations, but also aspire to some degree to coordinate their steps in the international arena in regard to the socialist and the developing countries, as well as in regard to other international problems.

Beijing and Washington are coordinating their steps with respect to Afghanistan, directing intervention against this country from Pakistani territory. At the time of the visit of the defense secretary of the United States in Beijing in January 1980, the two sides, as the news agency Xin Hua reported, analyzed the international situation, in particular the events in Afghanistan, and expressed their aspiration to strengthen their military potential, so as to "resist Soviet hegemonism", as the Chinese side emphasized.²²

The Chinese leaders and the heads of the leading imperialist powers have in actual fact come to the common conclusion that Kampuchea and Afghanistan are to be regarded as the main front of the struggle with the progressive forces of the world. Deng Xiaoping, in a conversation with the English minister of foreign affairs Carrington in April 1981, declared in direct terms that "Afghan and Kampuchean questions in no case must be lost from view because of the development of the Polish question, the Middle East question, or the war between Iran and Iraq," and called on all countries "to give active support to the resistance forces of Afghanistan and Kampuchea."²³

Washington and Beijing pressed a discussion of the "Afghan Question" on two recent sessions of the UN General Assembly, in spite of the resolute objections of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in violation of the basic principles of the UN Statute. In July 1981 they pressed for the holding of a so-called "international conference" on Kampuchea."

The aspiration of the Chinese leadership to enter into a partnership with the West is determined not only by interest in military-political cooperation, but also by the fact that the capitalist countries are regarded by Beijing as the main source of assistance for the goals of the program of the "Four Modernizations".

The West gladly supplies China with credits, hoping to reinforce China in its present anti-Soviet and anti-socialist positions. And confirming such dependence, as it were, Deng Xiaoping writes in an article for the Weekly [sic] of the British Encyclopedia for 1980: "How I imagine the future: Stronger in economic terms, China will play a vitally important role in the containment of hegemonism. . ."

But the West would like more. It is trying to tie Beijing to the capitalist system, the shortest road to which would be the restoration of the capitalist order of things in China. The monopolistic circles welcomed the publication on 26 January 1979 of the decision of the CPC Central Committee concerning the return to the Chinese bourgeoisie of all means and properties taken away and confiscated during the period of the "cultural revolution", including the payment of percentages on

bank deposits, the assignation of requisitioned housing to the former owners, and other measures of a similar character. They do not conceal their approval with respect to the Beijing policy of attracting foreign capital and the restoration of private enterprise activity in the country. A representative of the American government, as reported by the agency UPI on 12 September 1980 from Washington, characterized the changes in the leadership and politics of China in connection with the session of the National People's Congress (August-September 1980) as "a great leap to the West".

The monopolistic circles of the West clearly like the widespread "crisis of faith" in China as an expression of disappointment in Maoist "socialism". They are very impressed by statements such as those which the deputy chairman of the Standing Commission of the National People's Congress, formerly the largest Shanghai capitalist, [Zhong Yizhen?] was not ashamed to make in an interview with the French newspaper MATIN, having declared: "We must fully take the West as a model and purchase technology from it, we must renounce talk about class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat."²⁴

The American newspaper NEWS DAY, openly giving to understand what is expected of China in the West, on 18 February 1980 frankly declared that the volume of trade with China, which at the present time is relatively small, "will grow sharply if China will be regarded as an undisputed ally of the NATO countries. In this capacity, China can become the object of the broadest military and economic assistance by the West, which anew is ascending to the largest military deliveries to Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel."

In the foreign trade turnover of China in 1977-1979, the share of the capitalist countries increased from 83 to 88 percent, while that of the socialist countries decreased from 17 to 12 percent.²⁵

Little by little there is an increase in the number of mixed companies with the participation of foreign capital. At a session of the National People's Congress a law was adopted establishing exceedingly advantageous conditions of taxation for such enterprises, the tax rate being 20 percent lower than in the industrially developed countries and even several percent lower than in the developing countries. As the Xin Hua agency reported on 15 December 1980, China has already signed more than 300 contracts for the creation of mixed companies with foreign enterprises.

During the past few years China has made arrangements with the leading capitalist countries for the extension of credit for a total sum of approximately 30 billion dollars. However, the utilization of these funds is moving very slowly. Moreover, having encountered serious economic difficulties, China during the past two years suspended the realization of a number of projects that had begun construction with the aid of foreign firms. "bottlenecks in the economy," the American magazine NEWSWEEK wrote with irritation on 27 April 1981, 'engendered basically by the mismanagement of the leaders and the shortsightedness of those who are formulating the plans for economic development, are the main reason for the deterioration of prospects."

The Chinese leadership, which within the framework of the overall program of the "Four Modernizations" gives priority to the modernization of the army, shows

noticeable interest in the latest military technology of the Western countries and in the technology of its production. In their turn, the representatives of the Western monopolies, who are interested in binding China more closely to the capitalist countries, are prepared to open their arsenals to China.

In the course of the visit of US Secretary of State Haig in China in June 1981, the American side announced the decision to include China in the category of "friendly developing states". This measure gives China access to the means for conducting contemporary warfare, down to offensive equipment, which represents a qualitatively new step by comparison with the decision of the preceding American administration to sell China technology of "twofold purpose", applicable to both civilian and military needs.

However, regardless of the fact that anti-Sovietism and anti-socialism constitute a rather firm basis for the allround rapprochement between China and the imperialist powers, in the first place the United States, there remain at the same time profound disagreements among them, some of them having an irreconcilable character.

In the establishment of official relations between the two countries on 1 January 1979, the United States openly demonstrated an unequal approach to China. In moving to fulfill the demand of China in regard to the severance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the United States nevertheless made two stipulations. First of all, they demanded that the reunification of China with the island will be realized by peaceful means, without the use of force. And, secondly, the United States declared that it will continue to supply weapons to Taiwan. These positions were reinforced in American legislation. The first demand the Chinese leadership has de facto silently accepted, and from that time on official Beijing practically no longer talks about the "liberation" of Taiwan, but only about its "return to the bosom of the motherland". As far as the other American demand is concerned, the Chinese side, although it expressed its dissatisfaction in this regard from time to time, fails to take any decisive action.

Thus, in the present stage a compromise has been reached in the question of Taiwan, a compromise on an unequal basis, where the sovereign rights of China are infringed upon.

Chinese-American contradictions in the question of Taiwan and in other questions bear a rather sharp character; nevertheless at the present time the predominant tendency in the relations of the two countries is military-political cooperation on the basis of the struggle against the forces of socialism and the national liberation movement. In an interview with Italian journalists on 17 April 1980, Deng Xiaoping declared that "the maintenance of friendly relations between China and the United States is not a measure dictated by market considerations, but a long-term, strategic policy."²⁶ The new American administration, in its turn, has expressed its desire to continue the policy of its predecessors.

The Chinese leadership conducts a reactionary policy in regard to the developing countries, a policy which is only in keeping with the interests of the imperialist and neocolonial forces. In order to justify such a policy in some way in the eyes of the world progressive community, the Beijing hegemonists resort to complicated maneuvering in the ideological sphere.

In this case, the Beijing leaders must resort to new and still more crude distortions of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Thus, distorting the meaning of the Leninist propositions concerning the progressive and reactionary aspects of the nationalism of oppressed nations²⁷ and resorting to the method of juggling the facts, they insolently assert that the bands of Afghan rebels, acting on the orders of their Washington and Beijing patrons against the legitimate democratic government of Afghanistan, represent, as it were, "progressive nationalism", while the bearer of "reactionary nationalism" is. . . the Soviet Union.²⁸

The fact that the developing countries do not wish to subject themselves to the directions of Beijing is explained by the Chinese theoreticians "by the corruption of the national liberation movement in some countries" or by the fact that these countries, as it were, turned out to be "temporarily deceived by the slogans of the Soviet Union."²⁹ Nevertheless, they fall into contradictions with their own conceptions, in particular with the "theory of the three worlds", which regards the developing countries as a homogeneous "Third World". This once again proves the anti-scientific character of their views on questions of the national liberation movement, a character which is hostile to Marxism-Leninism.

In words Beijing stands for the "unity" with all of the "Third World", but in actual fact it is counting on the most reactionary forces in the developing countries. These are the already mentioned Afghan counterrevolutionaries. These are the fascist regime in Chile. In the recent past these have been the proimperialist bands of Holden Roberto and Savimbi, who have tried to prevent the victory of the progressive forces in Angola. These are the Shah of Iran who was overthrown by the Iranian people. These are the bloody tyrant Pol Pot thrown off by the Kampuchean people. These are the proimperialist regime of Sadat in Egypt and other forces similar to it. It is perfectly obvious that Beijing can count on support of its anti-Soviet and anti-socialist program only among these proimperialist and antipopular forces.

The Chinese leadership tries to thrust an anti-Soviet platform on the countries that have gained liberation, asserting that the Soviet Union "has become the main threat to national independence and state security of the states of the Third World,"³⁰ and for this reason "the struggle against Soviet social imperialism is the main content of the contemporary national movement of many countries."³¹

However, the reactionary content of Beijing's policy in regard to the liberated countries is not limited to this only. Under the slogan of the "unity of the states of the second and third worlds", the Chinese leaders call upon them to develop all-round relations with the imperialist countries, the former home countries. It is entirely understandable that such a policy serves only the interests of the imperialist and neocolonial circles. Thus, Beijing is executing the role of accomplice and partner of imperialism in the liberated countries.

From the very beginning, the Chinese leadership approved a separate Egyptian-Israeli agreement, concocted with the active participation of American imperialism. Taking into account the negative reaction of the majority of the Arab countries, it did this

rather cautiously, but nevertheless with determination. Deng Xiaoping, for example, having received a special envoy of Sadat at the end of February 1979, expressed "high admiration" for the policy of the Egyptian president. All of this provided the Cairo press with the foundation for publishing the communique from Beijing in prominent places on the day of the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of 26 March 1979, reading that the Chinese leadership supports this "peaceful" agreement.

It is clear that such a position by Beijing obviously reveals its duplicity in regard to the cause of the Arabs, since it is impossible simultaneously to make declarations about solidarity with the Arabs in the Palestinian question and support a separate agreement manufactured by the Americans.

As the conference of communist and workers' parties of the Arab countries that took place in April and May of 1981 noted, "in the Chinese leadership imperialism has found a faithful ally in the realization of its plans."³²

In order to conceal the vulnerability of its position on the Near East question, the Beijing leaders resort to maneuvering, they even criticize, albeit cautiously, the United States for the fact that it "has not taken a realistic position" and Israel, which "is resorting to the tactic of delay in the negotiations on Palestinian autonomy."³³

In this connection the bugaboo of the "Soviet threat" is once again dragged out into the light, in this case with respect to the Near East. In such a situation, the United States, according to Beijing's assertions, proves to be the only force capable of "finding a way out" of the "critical" situation.

The regular outburst of anti-Sovietism in Beijing in connection with the situation in the Near East coincided with the aggravation of the same kind of hysteria in Washington. This coincidence was not accidental. The fact is that China decided to support the imperialist plan of the creation of a "branch of NATO" in the region of the Near East. Washington would like to locate new bases in this region, suitable for a fleet and aviation equipped with atomic weapons. They are talking not only about using the atoll of Diego Garcia, but also about new bases in Somalia, Oman, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. Beijing is dying to help Washington. Thus the Chinese leaders voluntarily carry out the role of accomplices of imperialism. The aspiration once again to slander the socialist countries and to shield the United States in every way clearly shows through in the conduct of Beijing in connection with the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, when the Beijing press attempts to represent these events as "advantageous only to the Soviet Union".³⁴

Lately the Beijing leadership is undertaking steps towards a rapprochement with India, aspiring in so doing to bring about the deterioration of its relations with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist commonwealth. In these conditions, both the United States and Japan are actively helping Beijing, prompting India to meet the Chinese plans half-way. Thus, in this question, too, the close cooperation between Beijing and the West is clearly apparent.

As was noted at the Soviet-Vietnamese meeting that took place at the beginning of July 1980 in Moscow, Beijing, with the support of the United States, is trying to

destabilize the situation in the region of Indochina, and to this end organizes military demonstrations on the Chinese-Vietnamese border, encourages provocative attacks of the remnants of the Pol Pot bands against the People's Republic of Kampuchea, and exerts undisguised pressure on the member countries of ASEAN [Association of South-East Asian Nations]. The complications at the border of Thailand and Kampuchea, which took place at the end of June 1980 and later, are also directly connected with the hegemonic policy of Beijing. A proposal by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea at the beginning of 1981 about the holding of a regional conference among the two groups of states (Indochina and the members of ASEAN) for the purpose of guaranteeing peace, stability, friendship and cooperation in Southeast Asia met with a negative reception by the Chinese side. All facts convincingly demonstrate that the Chinese leadership has betrayed the interests of the national liberation movement.

Neither has the provocative policy of the Chinese leadership aimed at kindling a world conflagration undergone any important changes. True, during the past few years Beijing has begun to disguise its provocative policy more often. The premier of the PRC State Council, Zhao Ziyang, welcoming the prime minister of New Zealand in September 1980, said: "We are not only concerned with the security of our country, but devote great attention to the defense of peace in the whole world."³⁵

However, such phrases are not enough to deceive anyone. Both Mao Zedong and his successors invariably acted and are acting as opponents of peaceful coexistence, occupied and are occupying militarist and inflammatory positions, attempt to provoke a world war, to bring about the collision of the states of the two systems, in the first place the Soviet Union and the United States, proposing that this will help to accelerate the realization of the hegemonic goals of Beijing, the establishment of Chinese rule over the world.

The essentially negative attitude of the Chinese leadership toward peaceful coexistence and its unwillingness to encourage the establishment of these principles in international relations find supplementary confirmation also in the Beijing declarations on the "inevitability" of a new world war. Indeed, if war is "inevitable", why worry about peaceful coexistence?

One of the first statements of that kind against peaceful coexistence was made by the Maoists in April 1960, having published the collection "Long Live Leninism".³⁶ This position of theirs remained unchanged to the present time. The entire difference between the 1960s and the present time lies in the fact that, if at that time imperialism was called the main source of war and Beijing attempted to provoke the socialist countries into a collision with the West, now the Soviet Union is declared to be the "main breeding ground of war" and the Chinese leaders call upon the West to inflict a blow on the countries of socialism. Moreover, all responsibility for a future collision is ascribed to the Soviet Union.

Clearly under the influence of widespread international criticism of the Beijing thesis on the "inevitability of war" as instigating and provocative, its authors at the beginning of the 1970's "compromised" to a certain extent, having announced the possibility of "delaying" and even "preventing"³⁷ war. However, the "rallying" of all countries in one anti-Soviet, anti-socialist and "broadest international front" is advanced as a condition for such a possibility.

The Chinese leadership does not cease to incite the countries of the West to intensify the confrontation with the Soviet Union. Already at the beginning of the 1970's Beijing asserted that war will occur in Europe and called upon the West European countries to arm themselves and get prepared for war. Behind these provocative appeals it would be difficult not to discern the desire to interfere with the process of detente in Europe and, in particular, the holding of an all-European conference on questions of the security and cooperation in Europe.

In the second half of the 1970's Beijing made a switch. Now it began to assert that the developing countries will be the first target of "Soviet expansion". This thought was first developed by Hua Guofeng at the 11th CPC Congress.

After the trip of Hua Guofeng to the countries of Western Europe in October-November 1979, the Chinese leadership introduced additional clarifications in the conception of "Soviet expansion", having placed a heavy accent on the "threat" posed by the Soviet Union to the developing countries. In a conversation with the leader of the Italian Socialist Party Craxi in mid-November 1979, Hua Guofeng, as reported by [Agence] France-Presse, declared that the Soviet "threat" to Western Europe at the given moment was no greater than the "threat" which was hanging over four other regions of the world--South-East Asia, the Near East, Africa³⁸ and Central America, and that the strengthening of the Soviet Union in these four "hot points" will lead to the encirclement of Europe. Such declarations by the Chinese leaders were aimed not only at the intimidation of the developing countries with the "Soviet threat", but also at the provocation of the activation of imperialism in precisely those regions where during the past few years the national liberation movement attained its greatest victories. In this once again the proimperialist tendency of Chinese foreign policy is clearly manifested.

Persistently conducting a provocative and inflammatory policy, the Chinese leaders call upon the Western countries to abandon the "policy of appeasement" (this is what they call the policy of peaceful coexistence in Beijing now). As the agency UPI reported, this, in particular, is what Deng Xiaoping talked about in his conversation with the American journalists Hearst Jr. and Kingsbury-Smith on 5 March 1980.

The Beijing propaganda, which openly incites the Western countries against the USSR, goes as far as direct calls for war against our country, so as to "stop war through war"³⁹, as they depict it in Beijing.

In the aspiration to nudge the Western powers towards a military confrontation with the socialist countries, the Chinese leaders are making a crude attempt to play on the pride of the West. They now repeat particularly frequently in Beijing: "The Soviet Union attacks, while the United States retreats", etc. The article "The 'Fourth' Hotpoint of Soviet-American Opposition", published in the foreign policy journal SHIJIE ZHISHI asserted that the operations of the socialist countries in Central America and the Caribbean Basin, as it were, "directly threaten the security of the United States and paralyze the forces of the United States which are fighting with the Soviet Union for the hegemony of Europe and in the whole world."⁴⁰

His declarations and actions in the United Nations and outside this organization speak of the inclination of Beijing to poison the international atmosphere and to wreck detente.

Speaking on 24 September 1980 at the plenary meeting of the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly, the Chinese minister of foreign affairs in categorical terms characterized as "masquerade" the urgent question "Some Urgent Measures for Diminishing the Danger of War", which was introduced by the Soviet Union into the agenda of the day of the session. At the same session of the UN General Assembly, the Chinese delegation did not take part in the voting on the Soviet draft of a resolution on the halting of the production of nuclear weapons in all its forms. The Chinese leaders met with slander the proposal on ways of safeguarding peace and security in the region of the Persian Gulf, with which comrade L. I. Brezhnev came forward in India in December 1980.

The Chinese press crudely distorts the constructive position of the Soviet Union at the Madrid meeting of the representatives of the states and participants of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Beijing leaders, as usual, take an obstructionist position in the question of disarmament, disguising their inclination to interfere with the understandings in this sphere by the demagogic demand for the disarmament, first of all, of two powers--the Soviet Union and the United States. Everything speaks to the fact that the policy of the Chinese leadership runs counter to the interests of peace and security on the earth.

In recent times, when the reactionary imperialist circles intensify their attacks on the positions of world socialism and the national liberation movement and aspire to raise obstacles in the path of disarmament and detente, to reduce to nought all accomplishments in this sphere that have been attained during the past years thanks to the efforts of the socialist countries and, above all, the Soviet Union, the Beijing hegemonists either openly approve and support the imperialist actions or directly cooperate with the forces of imperialism in these steps. Having from the very beginning come out against the Soviet-American negotiations about the limitations of strategic weapons, could not conceal its obvious satisfaction when the United States postponed the ratification of the SALT-2 Agreement. It approved as an "important measure" the decision adopted in December 1979 by the session of the NATO Council concerning the placement of new American medium range missiles in Western Europe, missiles targeted on the USSR and its allies. It helped the Americans to raise a ballyhoo in 1979 around their fabrication of a so-called "presence" of Soviet troops in Cuba, and actively supported the attempts of Washington to wreck the Olympic Games in Moscow in the summer of 1980. Having developed an anti-Soviet campaign of slander around the events in Afghanistan, Beijing pursues the goal of putting a smoke-screen around the imperialist plans of the creation of a new network of military bases in the Indian Ocean, in the countries of the Middle and the Near East, and also on the African continent. In connection with the session of the NATO Council (December 1980), Beijing not only again came out in full support of the militarist anti-Soviet policy of the NATO circles, but also directly called upon the countries and participants of this organization "to take more decisive action to restrain hegemonism" (this is how they now refer to the Soviet Union in Beijing).⁴¹ All of these facts once again convincingly characterize the current leaders of China as partners and allies of imperialism.

The new initiatives of the Soviet Union in regard to the strengthening of peace, the deepening of detente, and the curbing of the arms race, which are contained in

the Report delivered at the 20th CPSU Congress by comrade L. I. Brezhnev, from the very beginning met with a very negative reaction in Beijing. By means of the publication of its own slanderous materials, as well as the reprinting of the anti-Soviet statements of the most extreme reactionary bourgeois press, the Chinese press attempted to distort the meaning of the new Soviet initiatives and to deprecate the significance of the 26th Congress of our party.

The CPSU and the other Marxist-Leninist parties, taking into account the foreign policy course of the current Chinese leadership and its danger for world affairs and the social progress of mankind, are conducting a consistent and principled struggle against the anti-Marxist ideology and policy of Beijing. They view this activity as international assistance to the Chinese people, which is dreaming of leading its country out of the deep crisis into which Maoism has plunged it and onto the wide road of socialist construction and friendship among peoples.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXVI s'ezda KPSS" [Materials on the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 11.
2. Ibid., pp 10-11.
3. See PRAVDA, 23 August 1981.
4. See RENMIN RIBAO, 1 July 1981.
5. Mao Zedong, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Vol 4, Beijing, 1967, p 117 (in Russian).
6. RENMIN RIBAO, 1 November 1977.
7. Ibid., 14 October 1974.
8. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochinenii" [Collected Works], Vol 41, p 401.
9. HONG QI, 1980, No 4, p 16.
10. Mao Zedong, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Vol 5, Beijing, 1977, p 340.
11. "Materialy VIII Vsekitayskogo s'ezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Kitaya" [Materials on the 8th All-Chinese Congress of the Communist Party of China], Vol 1, Beijing, 1956, p 8.
12. See PRAVDA, 6 December 1979.
13. See CHENG MING (Hong Kong), 6 March 1980.
14. See RENMIN RIBAO, 1 July 1981.

15. RENMIN RIBAO, 18 February 1979.
16. See CHENG MING (Hong Kong), 6 March 1980.
17. Henry Kissinger, "White House Years", Boston, 1979, p 1090.
18. RENMIN RIBAO, 1 January 1973.
19. Ibid., 5 February 1980.
20. Ibid., 7 April 1981.
21. SHIJIE ZHISHI, 1981, No 7.
22. RENMIN RIBAO, 11 January 1980.
23. Ibid., 4 April 1981.
24. MATIN, 3 September 1980.
25. EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA, 1980, No 15.
26. RENMIN RIBAO, 18 April 1980.
27. See V. I. Lenin, 'Polnoye sobraniye sochinenii', Vol 24, p 132.
28. HONG QI, 1980, No 4, pp 15-16.
29. Ibid., 1980, No 8, p 43.
30. RENMIN RIBAO, 24 April 1980.
31. HONG QI, 1980, No 8, p 43.
32. PRAVDA, 5 July 1981.
33. RENMIN RIBAO, 7 March 1980.
34. Ibid., 12 October 1980.
35. Ibid., 12 September 1980.
36. "Da zdravstvuyet leninizm" [Long Live Leninism], Beijing (Publishing House in Russian).
37. RENMIN RIBAO, 27 November 1980.
38. The journal SHIJIE ZHISHI (No 13, 1980, p 10) "clarifies": South Africa.
39. RENMIN RIBAO, 16 July 1980.

40. SHIJIE ZHISHI, 1980, No 13, p 10.

41. See RENMIN RIBAO, 15 December 1980.

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INTERNATIONAL

WORKS OF ARAB MARXISTS ON ISLAM REVIEWED

Moscow NAUKA I RELIGIYA in Russian No 11, 1981, pp 60-61

[Article by A. Ignatenko, candidate in philosophical sciences: "To See the Social Essence of a Phenomenon"]

[Text] In the developing countries of the Near and Middle East, which are struggling for their national independence and choosing their path of social and economic development, many socio-political mass movements are operating under Islamic slogans and have a religious coloring. What is the attitude toward such movements of the communist and those workers' parties whose program ideology is Marxism-Leninism?

Their attitude toward religious socio-political mass movements is complicated and corresponds to Lenin's instructions: To see the social essence of a phenomenon and the place of a religious movement in the struggle of the forces of progress and imperialism. It is precisely this aspect of the problem to which L. I. Brezhnev called attention at the XXVI CPSU Congress when he evaluated actions employing Islamic slogans. "Everything depends," he said, "on what the real content of one or another movement is."

In their practical work and propagandistic activities, Marxist-Leninists in Moslem countries are also guided by an instruction of Lenin's: There is no reason at all "to put the religious question in first place, which by no means belongs to it. . ."¹ In their articles, books, and public statements, they explain that "the battle which is being waged by Marxism is not a religious one, is not a battle between believers and atheists, but is a class struggle between property owners and those who do not own property, between the proletariat and capitalism." This was written by the Lebanese Marxist, Faysal Darraj, in his book, "Marxism and Religion" (Beirut, 1978).

These same positions are taken by the Egyptian, M. A. al-'Alim. In the article, "Islam and Revolution", he writes about the Marxist-Leninist attitude toward religion: "Its essence consists not in a critique of the sky, but in a critique of the earth. For this reason, Marxism is not an institution for the dissemination of atheism. It is a theory of struggle for the changing and renewal of the earth. It is from this point of view that Marxism objectively defines the character of its attitude toward religious movements. . . . Marxism is not opposed in principle to religious movements, but defines its attitude toward

them in the light of the positions of these movements in the national and social revolution." (The newspaper, AL-ITTIHAD, 13 and 17 April 1979)

In their evaluations of the different social movements in the Moslem world, the ideologists of the communist and workers' parties in the Arab countries base themselves on a deep knowledge of the essence of Islam and of its role in the life of peoples during different historical periods. History bears irrefutable witness to the fact that there was never a real unity under Islamic banners, and that there always existed an "economic struggle," a struggle between "Moslem-rulers" and "Moslem-subjects." This is shown on the basis of the example of diverse social movements in the Moslem world by the Iraqi student of the period of early Islam, Hadi al-'Alawi, in his article, "The Class Struggle in Islam" which was published in the periodical AL-SAHAFAH AL-JADIDAH (No 6, 1976). The methodological basis for this author, as for other Arab Marxists who perform evaluations of the history of Islam, is the general theoretical theses which were developed by K. Marx, F. Engels, and V. I. Lenin.

In his book "Materialist Tendencies in Arabic-Islamic Philosophy" (Beirut, Part I, 1978; Part II, 1979) the member of the CC and of the Lebanese Communist Party, Husayn Muruwah, emphasizes that already during the Middle Ages in the Moslem East religious philosophical forms were opposed by powerful currents of progressive, materialistic thought, but both were above all a reflection of the existing socio-economic conditions and were connected with the level of development of the material productive forces and of production relations.

It is well-known that the revisionist ideas of Roger Garaudy regarding religion in general and Islam in the Arab countries in particular exercised a certain influence on social thought in the Arab countries. Garaudy attempted to prove that Islam, in and of itself, is progressive, and that certain reactionary features were given to it by the ruling classes.

Arab Marxist-Leninists have refuted this appraisal of Islam. "We cannot," F. Darraj writes in the above-mentioned book "Marxism and Religion," "regard religion as a "charitable mission" whose essence was allegedly distorted by the state apparatus, as Roger Garaudy asserts; that is, we cannot deny only the compensatory aspect of religion and preserve faith as a 'necessity of the human spirit.' Religion is reactionary in its essence, and we are unable to say that this reactionariness is limited or partial, for this would mean that religion could be 'corrected' and 'cleansed.' But such an attempt would be like an attempt by a man to pull himself out of the water by his own hair."

Yes, Islam has frequently become a banner for progressive social movements, and Arab communist-Leninists know their history well. But they state that this does not provide grounds for recognizing Islam as a progressive ideology. "In studying our cultural heritage and in revealing the democratic and revolutionary traditions in the history of Islam," writes the Sudanese Communist 'Abd-al-Rahman in his article "The Contribution of Marxist Thought to Islamic Studies" in the periodical AL-SHYUYU'I (No 142, 1975), "we have to stay far away from the

naive oversimplification which was followed, for example, by Mao Ze-dong when he connected the teachings of Confucius with Marxist's theory; from an obsession with eclectic combinations and confusions from which the Arab petty bourgeoisie suffers in its readiness to state that Marxist thought is completely contained in Arabic-Islamic thought; and from a capitulation before the peacocky magnificence which blinded certain Arab progressive thinkers when Roger Garaudy deigned--under the overall democratic influence of the Algerian revolution on France--to include Arabic and Islamic scholars in the list of thinkers from whom dialectical materialism can get its categories. We are not seeking an Arab-Hegel and a Moslem-Feuerbach, a Ricardo and Adam Smith in an economic course conducted by Abbasids and Ommiyads, Saint-Simon and Owen in a movement of Karmaths. . . . We are seeking that which resurrects the general human heritage in our history, the democratic values and concepts in the history of our people."

This kind of struggle against the revisionist distortions of the Marxist view of religion and its essence and social functions is of great importance at the present time when a number of events in the Near and Middle East have impelled certain progressive figures in the Arab countries to acknowledge the invariable progressive nature of Islam in the history of the peoples of the Upper and Lower East.

Communists and the ideologists of progressive parties in the Arab countries are doing a great deal to propagandize the Marxist-Leninist heritage regarding religion and atheism. They are publishing the works of Lenin which reveal the role of religion during the course of the political struggle and socio-economic transformations. (In Beirut, for example, in 1978, the book "V. I. Lenin. Texts on the Attitude Toward Religion" was published by the "AL-TALI'AH" Publishing House in a translation into the Arabic language by Muhammad Qubbah). They try to make Lenin's appraisals of various political movements, above all those which took place under religious, including Islam slogans, the property of the broad masses. In particular, in characterizing Pan-Islamism as an ambiguous tendency and one that was in the final analysis hostile to the interests of the people, they cite V. I. Lenin's words to the effect that Pan-Islamism tried to "unite the liberation movement against European and American imperialism with a strengthening of the position of the khans, land owners, mullahs, and so forth."² (See, for example, H. Murunnah, M. A. al-'Alim, M. Dakrub, and S. Sa'd. *Studies of Islam*. Beirut, 1980).

Progressive liberation movements in the history of the Arab peoples which took place under the slogans of Islam preserved their progressive character only if they went beyond a purely religious framework and if they were capable of solving social and economic problems. However, the history of the Moslem world provides a large number of examples of both the ambiguity of movements which took place under Islamic slogans and of their openly reactionary nature. Marxist-Leninists in the Arab countries set it as one of their tasks, as 'Abd-al-Rahman writes in the above-mentioned article, "to unmask right-winged parties, groups, and governments which make use of the Islamic religion to confuse the masses." Thus, they struggle uncompromisingly against the reactionary organization of the "Moslem Brotherhood."³

In his book "Thoughts About the Philosophy of the 'Moslem Brotherhood'" (Khartoum, 1968) the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Sudan, 'Abd-al-Khalil Mahjub, has shown that the division of mankind according to a religious characteristic and attempts by the ideologists of this organization to present the struggle in the contemporary world as a religious struggle has the goal of "blacking out the class consciousness of the working masses; for if everyone is a Moslem, there is no sense in a class struggle, no difference between the rich and the poor, and no point to socialist development. This is the essence of the preachings of the 'Moslem Brotherhood'."

Analyzing the statements of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of this organization, in his article "Religion and the Class Struggle" in the periodical AL-TARIQ (No 2, 1978), Faysal Darraj shows that the former's sermons appealed for "brotherhood" between workers and entrepreneurs. At the basis was the fact that the "concept of private property was connected with God, and God with the property." "God," writes Faysal Darraj, "and private property became sacred and interconnected, synonyms of a kind. . . . But since God preserves private property, it turned out that it is more sacred than God Himself."

This propaganda work is performed by Arab Marxist-Leninists actively and purposefully since they understand its great political importance; the masses are under the strong influence of Islam and of religious traditions which for them are inseparable from national traditions, and it is for this reason that they frequently become the victims of different reactionary forces which make use of the profound religiosity of the masses and cover over their anti-popular goals with Islamic slogans. "Marxist thought," 'Abd-al-Rahman writes in the above-mentioned article, "stands before a theoretical and political task--to convince these masses that their good and human aspirations for justice and equality can be realized in today's world only under socialism and, consequently, in a struggle for the realization of this system and in a rejection of the capitalist path and of the forces which call for it."

Arab Communists accept into their ranks all workers, regardless of whether they are atheists or believers. They base themselves on historical experience which has shown that "the unity of this genuinely revolutionary struggle of the oppressed class for the creation of heaven on earth is more important for us than a unity of opinion among proletarians about heaven in the sky."⁴ Thus, in the second article of the Charter of the Iraqi Communist Party it is stated: "Any citizen (citizeness) of worthy behavior who has reached the age of eighteen, regardless of which religion or nationality he or she may belong to, may be, after passing through a period of candidacy, a member of the Iraqi Communist Party." However, along with this the task is that of "the dissemination of scientific consciousness and culture among the citizens and of a struggle against prejudices."

Of course, these tasks are not isolated from the basic ones which have been defined in the economic, social, and political spheres. The communists of the Arab countries proceed from Lenin's thesis that "only the class struggle of the working masses, by thoroughly involving the widest strata of the proletariat in

conscious and revolutionary social practice, is capable of in fact liberating the oppressed masses from the yoke of religion."³

The Arab Marxist-Leninists emphasize in their public actions that their position does not consist in an endeavor to destroy religion but in an endeavor to destroy class society and to build a classless communist society. The struggle of the working class for a change in social conditions leads to a change in its consciousness, for it, in essence, is a reflection of his social conditions. Marxist-Leninists strive to involve believing workers in public political activities and to help them to become aware of their rights and to struggle for them, without making any differences between believing workers and workers who are non-believers. To be with the masses, in the depth of the masses, to lead them, and to make use of every opportunity to explain the goals of communists and to unite all workers--this, in particular, is what Arab communists see as their task.

Proceeding from their chief goals, the Marxist-Leninists in Arab countries collaborate with democratically minded representatives of the clergy in solving common democratic tasks. The Iraqi Committee for the Defense of Peace, for example, had working in it, along with communists, the important Islamic religious figures 'Abd-al-Karim al-Mashta and 'Abd-al-Latif Muttalib. Today their work is being continued by Yusuf Qarqush who states that he sees his task in "the defense of the progressive gains in our country (Iraq--A. I.), in unmasking imperialist methods, and to inflict defeats upon the conspiratorial plans of imperialism locally, and on an all-Arab and world scale." In an interview with a correspondent from the press organ of the CC of the Iraqi Communist Party he emphasized that activities of this kind do not come into contradiction with his religious convictions."

Today a large number of facts are showing that the Marxist-Leninist attitude toward religion is becoming increasingly influential in the socio-political thought and political practice of the Arab countries. This can be judged by the number of books devoted to an examination of religion from Marxist-Leninist positions and by the popularity which is enjoyed by all publications and all public appearances on this topic.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," Vol 12, p 146.
2. Ibid., Vol 41, p 166.
3. For more details, see the article by Ye. Artyukhova and A. Ostal'skiy "The Moslem Brotherhood in the Service of Reaction," NAUKA I RELIGIYA, No 2, 1981.
4. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," Vol 12, p 146.
5. Ibid., Vol 17, p 416.

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NATIONAL

ROLE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN DEMOCRATIZATION OF SOVIET SOCIETY SURVEYED

Moscow VOPROSY FILOSOFII in Russian No 10, 1981 pp 14-22

[Article by Yu. A. Tikhomirov: "The Development of Political Institutions in Socialist Society"]

[Text] The concept of political institutions is taking on an ever larger role in the study of the theoretical and methodological problems of the political life and political system of socialism. What is their nature and system, in what is the process of institutionalization expressed, what tasks are accomplished through the effective functioning of political institutions, and how do they influence the social creative activities of the masses and the development of the individual?

In order to have a correct understanding of the nature of political institutions, it is necessary, in our view, to proceed from the fact that socialism is a highly organized society which is cognizant of the objective laws and which consciously controls the processes of its social development. The role of social institutions consists in the fact that they are a means for the directed control and regulation of the social life and behavior of people. Social institutions may be divided into political institutions which are connected with the realization of policy and power and with the socio-political life of society; economic institutions which express the elements of the economic system; purely social institutions, and others. The nature of political institutions is completely determined by the character of politics.

They represent a structurally formed method for the accomplishment of political tasks, and a method for the structural articulation of the system. Political institutions are a consequence of the process of structuralization in the political sphere and of the acquisition by political relationships of a structural form. Institutions impart to politics the appropriate external expressions and ensure functioning in forms which make it possible to accomplish the tasks facing society. One can define a political institution as an independent structural element of the political system which has been given an organizational and legal form and which is designed for the accomplishment of specific political tasks.

Of course, the question may arise: But what that is new is added by the concept of political institutions? In our opinion, it enriches the conceptual apparatus

of the theory of the political system and makes it possible, first, to more accurately define the specific nature of its component parts and, especially, of such a subsystem as the institutional one and, second, to more deeply reflect the dialectics of the process of institutionalization in a socialist society; thirdly, it throws a fuller light upon the systemic properties of the institutions of the political system and their interrelations; fourthly, it promotes an improvement of the methodology for studying the relationships of the political system, on the one hand, and of political life and other spheres, and also of society as a whole, on the other; and, fifthly, it makes it possible to perform an overall analysis of political institutions from the points of view of philosophy, sociology, law, and other disciplines.

The concept of "political institution" has to reflect the diversity of character, purpose, and degree of organization: first, structural territorial political institutions (express the territorial organization of political power--the national state and administrative territorial arrangements, inter-state unions, and so forth); second, organizational functional political institutions (the party, the agencies of the state, public organizations, labor collectives, mass information media, the army); and third, functional procedural political institutions which represent a formed method of accomplishing political tasks (elections, referendums, public discussions and consultations, instructions, and so forth).

Political institutions are distinguished by a high degree of system organization. The way they are set up and function can only be correctly understood in a broad social context, by insulating the existence of one or another institution as a part of a more general system. This more general system may be either an aggregate of homogeneous institutions, or the political system of society. The latter may be defined as a mechanism for the expression of politics and popular rule which effects the regulation of social and political activities and the control of social processes in the interests of ensuring the unity and progress of society. The political system acts, in the final analysis, as a highly important connecting axis which puts all of the political institutions into movement and determines their relationships. It provides for the system orderliness, harmony, and relations of political institutions and expresses the unity of society and the combination of the interests of classes and social strata, nations and peoples, and collectives. Political institutions serve the goal of the social integration of society and provide for the kind of accomplishment of tasks which is advantageous for all citizens. The connection between institutions is achieved thanks to the mechanism of their coordinated development and overall directed functioning.

It is important methodologically to introduce still another concept--"political institutionalization"--which expresses the process of the creation, adaptation, and transformation of political institutions during the course of historical development. With the help of this concept, it is possible to disclose more deeply the regularities, character, limits, and tempos of these processes, and the conditions which permit one to speak of the establishment of and one or another degree of the maturity of institutions and about the extent to which they have been formed.

An understanding of state legal institutions as "moments of rest" in the stream of political life is correctly brought to light in the literature. The connection between political action and institutional formation is such that the former "becomes subjectified" in the latter, while the institutional formation is constantly "desubjectified" in political actions and becomes their object, means, and criterion.

From the first days of Soviet power, V. I. Lenin devoted a great deal of attention to new institutions. The smashing of the bourgeois state machine did not mean the automatic elimination of all of the old institutions. The work of such institutions as the banks, post offices, and so forth were filled with a new content, the nature of the activities of the trade unions was enriched, and so forth.

This process has not taken place in the same way in the different socialist countries and a considerable amount of specificity is possible there in the future also. For full consideration has to be given to the experience and traditions of a given country, to its concrete historical circumstances, and to the uneven weights of different social and political institutions and the time of their emergence and change. For example, in Cuba, initially the forms of direct democracy developed more rapidly, and a representative system took shape later than in the other socialist countries. In the People's Republic of Bulgaria a system of public state bodies received the greatest development. In the countries with a socialist orientation, there is a gradual development on the basis of bodies of the revolutionary council type of a system of supreme representative agencies of power. The chief point is indisputable: what is being discussed on the whole is the establishment of a new structure of power which demands new forms for its realization.

In the socialist countries the processes of institutionalization are conditioned by changes of a socio-economic and political character and by the development of science and technology. International relations, of course, exercises a marked influence. With all of the main factors playing their roles, there occurs a dual process--the gradual transformation and modification of certain institutions in conformity with the changing tasks of social development, and the appearance and formation of new institutions which are characteristic for one or another stage of the development of socialist society. Their continuity reflects a stability and dynamism of the existence of political institutions.

Naturally, the most appreciable changes take place within large historical periods. In the USSR, in a society of mature socialism, the political institutionalization which has been given the status of law in the USSR Constitution is expressed, first, in a fuller disclosure of the potential of the basic political institutions (for example, the soviets, elections); secondly, in a modification of elements and an enrichment of the nature of a number of institutions (for example, the status of labor collectives); and, thirdly, in the appearance and consolidation of new institutions connected above all with the establishment of formed methods of the direct accomplishment by citizens of state and public affairs and with the realization of their rights (for

example, national public discussions, the right to make suggestions and criticize shortcomings in the work of state agencies and public organizations, and so forth).

The role of right and, especially, of the law in the regulation of political institutions is considerable. The law is a political measure--in this formula of Lenin's there is revealed the essence of the regulatory influence of the law on political institutions. The law stabilizes and strengthens the basic elements of every institution and gives to institutions stability and a general social significance. There is in operation a system of overall legislative regulation which includes constitutional propositions, special (status) laws about different institutions, and thematic laws whose points have to do with the functioning of institutions. After the adoption of the new Soviet Constitution, the legislative foundations of political institutions were perfected. The Regulation on the USSR's Supreme Soviet and the Laws on the USSR Council of Ministers, USSR Supreme Court, State Arbitration, and on kray and oblast Soviets went into effect, as did legislative acts on elections to the Soviets, on instructions, and on examining the proposals and statements of citizens. Laws are being prepared on labor collectives, on voluntary societies and unions, and so forth.

The ensuring of a balance and an equilibrium for institutions under socialism does not exclude contradictions. Sometimes there is an unevenness in the development of individual political institutions, and frequently the degrees of the juridical "formation" of an institution and of its reorganization lags behind the needs of life. The necessity for a more flexible adaptation by organizational structures of management, particularly for the accomplishment of overall tasks, was taken note of at the 26th CPSU Congress. Sometimes the weight of some of them is great while that of others is small, and there are cases of incorrect relationships between them. For example, manifestations of formalism which sometimes occur in a work of trade unions and in the holding of workers' meetings lower the importance of the channels for the solution of labor and production problems. Then administrative forms of management inevitably begin to predominate.

But these are non-antagonistic contradictions and their punctual and correct resolution in the interests of society brings about an increase in the effectiveness of institutions in social and political life. Planned political institutionalization is a law of the development of socialism. In a mature socialist society, there is a higher level of the combination of the stability and dynamicness of political institutions. As development occurs, their tasks, organization, and spheres of application will change.

The 26th CPSU Congress defined the basic directions of the economic and social development of our country. They are based on the enormous potential of socialism as a scientifically managed society. Its institutions have the task, in their systemic interconnections with one another, of deeply reflecting objective laws and creating the conditions for the realization of their basic requirements. The purpose of political institutions is to ensure directed social and political influence on social processes. It reflects the nature of management in a society and of the regulation characteristic of it, and also the

development of self-regulation and of the principles of social self-management.

The influence of institutions is not limited solely to the sphere of political relations; through them political institutions influence all of the basic aspects of the life of society--economic, social, spiritual, and international. Their properties as overall institutions for the management of state and social affairs show up clearly in this.

The functions of political institutions are not identical: some institutions are characterized by a multi-functional thrust, and others by the performance of a single chief function. But all of them are derivative from the general functions of the political system. What are these functions? First, the expression of the interests of the people, of social communities, and collectives and citizens, the development of the creative energies of the masses, and guaranteeing the participation by citizens in the management of state and social affairs. Secondly, the regulation--in accordance with the goals of politics and power--of the basic manifestations of social life, and the imparting of stability to the functioning of all of the social institutions in society. Thirdly, ensuring the effective accomplishment of the chief political and state tasks and influence on the solution of all of the tasks of management--in the field of economics, culture, scientific and technological progress, and so forth.

Moreover, the functions of political institutions have a kind of socio-genetic "given nature," since they are determined by the essence of the socialist system, the character of public ownership of the implements and means of production, by the socialist principle of labor organization, and by Marxist-Leninist ideology. The social "derivativeness" of these functions is also determined by the values which are characteristic of socialism. The institutions ensure their affirmation in life. And the political institutions themselves possess enormous social value in view of their rich creative potential and of the conscious attitude of the masses toward their functioning in the interests of society. Hence, the support for the institutions and the trust in them.

Political institutions under mature socialism also possess a normative characteristic which is expressed in constitutions and laws. The documents and decisions of the CPSU defined the chief goals of their functioning both within the framework of the foreseeable historical perspective and within the limits of a concrete historical period. The "Basic Directions for the Development of the USSR Economy for the Years 1976-1980" and the "Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for the Years 1981-1985 and for the Period Until 1990" are a rich program of the short-term and long-term functioning of political institutions. The development of science and the acceleration of scientific and technological progress, the development of industry, the agro-industrial complex, transportation and communications, and capital construction, and the tasks in the fields of social development and improving public well-being, environmental protection, the development of foreign economic relations, the improvement of management, and the development of active citizens define the actions of political institutions.

The operation of political institutions represents a cyclical process in which the existence of conditions and the choice of means of influence lead to the achievement of the goal, and their multi-phase functioning is renewed and continues on a new basis. Institutional action means a high measure of the concentration and scope of social actions which it is quite difficult to bring to light and establish. For consideration has to be given to the complexity of the structure of institutions, and also to the specific nature of types of institutions. Moreover, the consequences of their regulating influence sometimes do not show up immediately since a process occurs of the constant introduction of knowns, values, and so forth with the help of institutions in all of these spheres of social life, and also of influencing a strengthening of the socialist way of life, the level of social consciousness, and the development of stimuli and of activity by the individual.

The measurement of the effectiveness of the action of institutions is a difficult matter which requires the efforts of the representatives of various sciences. In the most general terms, one may speak about the kind of analysis and calculation of the development tendencies of political institutions which make it possible to uncover the deep processes and interaction of the different factors and to see and punctually overcome contradictions which arise. Every political institution has to operate as an integrated structure with regard to the functioning of all of its component elements in precise accord with their basic purposes, providing for the achievement of those goals which are established normatively in the law.

The operation of an institution is connected with the use of various social regulators, both general ones and those determined by the functioning of one or another institution. Special-purpose programmed norms give them a general orientation, and the legal backing of institutions makes it possible for their structured influence on social relations. Consideration must also be given to other social norms of the "environment," including the orientations, values, and rules by which people actually guide themselves in the sphere of the action of one or another institution.

Let us emphasize once more that what we have in mind is not one-time, but a long cyclical functioning which makes it possible in toto to achieve the social effect for which the political institution has been, as it were, "designed." The measurement of the degree of attained effectiveness is performed by means of comparing actual result with the goals of the institution for each of the above-numerated functions.

The task of increasing the effectiveness of political institutions is important. This process is influenced in a decisive way by successes in economic and scientific development, in the efficient use of resources, and in raising the standard of living of people and their consciousness and culture and, finally, by stable international relations.

The accomplishment of state tasks on a high quality level is of the essence for organizational-functional institutions of the state agency type. For example,

the local soviets have the task of ensuring overall economic and social developments of their territory, of strengthening their influence of the activities of subordinate organizations, and of monitoring the observance of law. This requires a resolute overcoming of elements of formalism in the holding of the sessions of soviets, in the work of their executive apparatus, and in their methods of enlisting citizens in their work.

The skillful use of scientific methods of analyzing information and forecasting managerial situations and the making and carrying out of valid decisions is important for managerial agencies. A rhythmic managerial process will help to organize practical interaction between managerial agencies and enterprises, institutions, and organizations and with related agencies in the accomplishment of overall tasks. Managerial activities have to be oriented towards obtaining high final economic results.

Public organizations possess enormous social reserves whose use ensures a real increase in the activeness of their members in accomplishing intra-union and public matters and in using not formal, but practical methods of social influence. Labor collectives have the task not only of engaging more deeply in the affairs of their enterprise or institution, but also of actively influencing the solution of problems in their branch and on the territory of their rayon, city, or oblast, and also of general state problems. A strengthening of the "representation" of labor collectives at all levels of management is in full accord with the tendencies of this process.

The functional-procedural institutions which provide for the direct accomplishment by the public and by citizens of state and public affairs requires serious attention. For example, such a democratic institution as the People's Meeting is fixed in the laws on the local soviets. The procedure of working with instructions from electors and of examining the suggestions of citizens has been regulated. At the same time, not all of these institutions have developed in full measure, and considerable efforts are necessary here to regulate structural forms for the fuller enlistment of citizens in management and for the legal regulation of various procedures; for example, in the sphere of making decisions, providing citizens with information, and exercising supervision.

The organization and actions of political institutions are increasingly being built on the principle of public representation which goes beyond the framework of the soviets and of public organizations and embraces all of the elements of management, including boards and scientific and technical and other councils of the ministries. The gradual introduction of the congress system in the individual branches of the economy could be a natural continuation of this process. Already today congresses of teachers and of health care workers are producing an enormous democratic effect. The dissemination of their experience will make it possible on an even broader scale to involve in branch administration the immediate workers of the branch, labor collectives, and trade unions. Managerial agencies could be formed at such branch congresses within certain limits.

Political institutions in a socialist society have the task of accomplishing profoundly democratic tasks. Their influence on the development of the social and political activeness of the masses and on the comprehensive uncovering of all of the capacities of an individual is a most important indicator of the effectiveness of the operation of political institutions. In socialist society, institutions are oriented precisely in this direction, providing the channels and system of participation by citizens in the management of state and public affairs at all levels.

Political institutions are a powerful means of developing the social creativity of the masses. V. I. Lenin noted that the connection between the scope of social transformations and of the masses participating in their realization is a law of the development of socialism. The operation of political institutions is calculated for the kind of political behavior by all of the members of society and for such mass actions by the people and by classes, nations, strata, and collectives which are expressed in full confidence in the goals of the party and the state, in support of the measures for their realization, and in the development of political activeness and initiative in all of these spheres of social life, in the activities of all of the cells and institutions of the political system and of the state, in mass public movements, and in the dissemination of initiatives and advanced experience. In their turn, mass political actions serve as a stimulus for bringing about activeness by all of the creative forces of society in the sphere of economics, culture, scientific and technological progress, and so forth. A high degree of democracy is characteristic of mature socialist society. The Soviet people as a new historical community of people ensures--including with the help of political institutions--the ever wider enlistment of citizens in the solution of social problems.

Today, along with the development of forms of participation in the work of state agencies, the role of institutions of representational and direct democracy is growing. And this is expanding the possibilities for the complete expression of social interests and for ensuring their unity and for the discovery and use of public opinion. The formula which is used--"participation by citizens in the management of state and public affairs"--reflects the new measure for evaluating this process.

In the decisions and materials of the XXVI CPSU Congress, and in the "Basic Directions of the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for the Years 1981-1985 and for the Period Until 1990" the further development of socialist democracy is connected with the increased interest and public political activity of the workers and with an expansion of their participation in management. For this reason, the action of institutions on the development of the social and political activeness of the masses and on overcoming the passivity which still exists in certain strata of the population is acquiring paramount importance.

The development of the social activeness of citizens is subject to the influence of many factors. Of paramount importance is the creation of objective conditions:

growth in the economy, culture, their standard of living, their consciousness and so forth. The mechanism for the development of activeness is very complex and political institutions occupy an important place in this. Their influence is expressed in a rise in political culture and in the information available to citizens "in bringing them to the selection of goals, the working out and making of decisions, and the exercising of control. The participation by citizens in management becomes even more rich in content and systematic when it is applied to most of the functions of management on all of its levels.

At the same time, there arise in social practice a number of important problems of perfecting the institutional mechanism for the development of the activeness of citizens: a) the approach to this process as a spontaneous one has to be finally overcome, and a necessity is felt to manage it with the help of institutions; b) strict systematicalness has to be insured for the institutions and for democratic forms at all levels, with parallelism and disproportions in development prevented; c) there has to be a clear division of functions and at the same time close interaction between all of the democratic cells; d) it is important to continue the work on regulating the legal status of all cells of this kind; e) it is necessary to achieve a real activization of citizens becoming members of public organizations, making use of the entire system of the forms of public work and of all of the methods of measuring, evaluating, and stimulating them.

One more aspect of the problem. Political institutions are a stable organizational-procedural method of realizing the rights and freedoms of citizens. In this is their profoundly democratic meaning as unique structural guarantees for the rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens--the right to participate in management, to elect and be elected, to make suggestions and criticisms, to enter public organizations, and so forth. The decree of the CC CPSU "On a Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Educational Work" it is emphasized that not a single question which worries the workers should be left without an answer. It is necessary to make a deep and systematic study of public opinion, and, at the same time, to skillfully form it.

Do not political institutions contradict the interests of the free development of the individual? Bourgeois ideologists reply in the affirmative to this question, since, according to them, with the scientific and technological revolution and the increased complexity of the organization of social life gigantic "totalitarian institutions" which crush the individual appear. The social organization perishes, in their opinion, under the weight of enormous corporations, and a nation turns into a rigid managerial hierarchy consisting of an elite and an enormous mass of rightless people. Power and oppression intensify, thanks to the use of computers and other engineering innovations which paralyze any activity by the individual and exclude the possibility of freedom of choice.

In bourgeois countries there is a growing political alienation of citizens and a crisis of confidence in all institutions of power and in people who are in power, in all institutional forms of social transformational action. According

to the data of a public opinion questionnaire, in the United States trust in military men in 1966 was measured as 62% and in 1976 as 23%; in the Supreme Court--50 and 22%, respectively, in the leading organizations in the sphere of business--55 and 16%, in the Executive Branch--41 and 11%, and in Congress--42 and 9%.² Absenteeism is growing very rapidly in the United States. Thus, 62.8% of the voters participated in the 1960 presidential elections, in 1964--61.8, in 1968--60.9, in 1972--55.7, in 1976--54.4, and in 1980--52.3% of the voters.

The "opposition" between political institutions and the population also shows up in the growing endeavor by the citizens of bourgeois countries to by-pass them and find ways of directly influencing the solution of problems. In the Federal Republic of Germany and in certain Scandinavian countries these are unique forums of "citizen initiative" for the accomplishment of communal tasks and for the discussion of domestic political and international questions which make use of marches, meetings, collections of signatures, and so forth. In the state of California referendums are frequently held to fight against the authorities and put pressure on them by means of a directly expressed will of voters, and in France these were the spontaneous revolts of students against institutions in the 1960s.

All of these phenomena are characteristic of bourgeois society, where political and other social institutions are used in the interests of the ruling minority which tries to manipulate the actions of people. Socialism consistently affirms the principle of "The Free Development of Each is the Condition for the Development of All" which means--at the level at which we are interested--an orientation by political institutions toward the comprehensive development of the individual. Such is the purpose of institutions which are organized, as was noted above, on the basis of democracy and which are introducing the principles of public self-management.

The combination of public and personal interests also means the development in each individual of genuinely collectivist principles and of an understanding of his responsibility to society for his actions. Growing civic self-awareness reflects the deep-going process of the socialization of the individual.

The political institution personifies the unity of public and personal interests. For this reason, its operation is called upon to accomplish a complex of tasks: a) the development of a high level of political consciousness in people and of their political culture; b) the development of orientations and motives and stimuli for the interest participation by citizens in public life; c) the practical and competent accomplishment of state and public affairs, and participation in management at its various levels, including the performance of socio-political actions which are in the channel of the functioning of institutions; d) the assimilation and affirmation of the social and moral values by which an individual is really guided; e) the creation of deep trust in citizens in their social and political institutions by virtue of their high prestige in society.

V. I. Lenin connected the reorganization of the work of the economic organization with a profound consideration of the experience of the masses. "We have

to build our economic building . . . during the very heat of our work, while we are testing one or another institution, observing its experience, checking it with the collective common experience of the workers."³ Following Lenin's instructions, the CPSU is taking measures to improve the economic mechanism in close connection with an improvement of democratic institutions--a greater role for the Soviets, the use of voters' instructions in making up plans, the activization of labor collectives and trade unions in the sphere of management, the development of collective forms of labor organization and payments, and so forth.

Of course, this process has its difficulties and contradictions. Frequently the formal existence of a political institution does not have a marked influence on the development of the individual, just as poor work to increase the activeness of people and their real readiness to participate in public political life reduces the effectiveness of the operation of an institution and also the degree of citizen enlistment in the accomplishment of state and public affairs.

Sometimes, the internal reorganization of the work of institutions and their relations go slowly, although the growing activeness of people and the maturity of public opinion are creating impulses for more dynamic and larger-scale transformations.

The political institutions of socialist society actively participate in the accomplishment of political, economic, and social tasks. An increase in the effectiveness of their operation in the USSR is connected with a further democratization of state and public life and with an expansion of the participation by citizens in management. They are a powerful factor of progress in a socialist society on its way to communist public self-management. Political institutions themselves will be transformed during the course of this process.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. S. Manut, "K. Marx as a Theoretician of State," Moscow, 1979, p 50.
2. Yu. Zamoshkin, "American Foreshortenings," INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA, No 8, 1979, p 201.
3. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," Vol 36, pp 378, 379.

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CSO: 1800/165

REGIONAL

NEW VASKhNIL INSTITUTE SET UP IN KEMEROVO

Moscow SOBRANIYE POSTANOVLENIY PRAVITEL'STVA ROSSIYSKOY SOVETSKOY FEDERATIVNOY SOTSLAISTICHESKOY RESPUBLIKI in Russian No 25, 1981 pp 395-396

/Decree No 461, Moscow, 14 August 1981, by M. Solomentsev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and I. Zarubin, deputy administrator of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, on the Organization of the Kemerovo Scientific Research Institute of Agriculture of the Siberian Department of VASKhNIL/

/Text/ The RSFSR Council of Ministers decrees:

1. To adopt the proposal of the Kemerovskaya Oblast Committee of the CPSU, of the Kemerovskaya Oblast Executive Committee and of the Siberian Department of VASKhNIL /All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V. I. Lenin/ coordinated with the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology on the organization in the city of Kemerovo of the Kemerovo Scientific Research Institute of Agriculture of the Siberian Department of VASKhNIL at the base of the Kemerovskaya Oblast State Agricultural Experimental Station and of the Kemerovo Division of the Siberian Scientific Research and Planning-Technological Institute of Animal Husbandry.

To carry out the organization of the indicated institute within the allocations and wage fund provided for the Siberian Department of VASKhNIL for 1981.

2. To establish that the following are the basic directions in the scientific activity of the Kemerovo Scientific Research Institute of Agriculture:

development and improvement of farming systems with soil protective technology of soil cultivation;

development of methods of recultivation of land disturbed during the open-cut mining of minerals;

breeding of highly productive, new varieties of spring wheat and barley and development of promising technologies of their cultivation;

improvement and development of new breeds and lines of large-horned cattle and hogs;

development of new technologies of fodder production and feed preparation for the feeding of farm animals.

3. To reserve the functions of the state oblast agricultural experimental station for the Kemerovo Scientific Research Institute of Agriculture.
4. The Siberian Department of VASKhNIL should ratify the regulations of the Kemerovo Scientific Research Institute of Agriculture.

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CSO: 1800/187

REGIONAL

STRUCTURE OF RAYON AGROINDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION DESCRIBED

Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 12 Dec 81 p 2

/Interview with Ago Soasepp, chairman of the agroindustrial association of Pyarnuskiy Rayon, by M. Roginskiy, special correspondent of SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA: "The Coefficient of Unity"; date and place not specified/

/Text/ Correspondent: Two main factors predetermined this meeting. The November (1981) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, where Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech drew special attention to an improvement in the management of agriculture in the localities--on kolkhozes and sovkhozes and in the rayon link. The task of creating conditions that would "stimulate in every possible way the growth of agricultural production..." was set. It seems that the establishment as of 1 October of this year of agroindustrial associations in all the republic's rayons is one of the important steps in the accomplishment of this task. All of us more or less realize on what this process of reorganization is based. Agriculture cannot develop in an isolated way, without the solution of a number of social problems and without close contacts with enterprises for the repair of equipment, reclamation, capital construction, processing of agricultural raw materials, transport and so forth.

A. Soasepp: Exactly. It is not accidental that the concept of agroindustrial complex is first mentioned in the documents of the 26th CPSU Congress. Previously there were separate plans for industry working in and for rural areas and for agriculture. Such a division was especially felt on a rayon scale. Of course, the agricultural administration, managing subordinate farms, fought for its indicators; the farms of institutes and sectorial administrations of the Ministry of Agriculture, for their indicators and sectorial and departmental enterprises, all the more so. Everyone, to put it crudely, grabbed what he could: money, equipment, materials, forces of construction organizations and mineral fertilizers. One can say that some flourished, while others grew feeble. The rayon was unable to exert a direct, immediate effect on the state of affairs--only through ministries, committees and institutes. There was a need for a territorial body having the right and possibilities of selecting the optimal paths of both enterprises and farms toward the common goal--growth of the production of agricultural products. Thus, the establishment of agroindustrial associations was put on the agenda.

Correspondent: In this respect the experience of Pyarnuskiy Rayon was trailblazing for our republic...

A. Soasepp: Let us be faithful to the historical truth. Vil'yandiskiy Rayon, where the agricultural administration was abolished in 1975, was the first to embark on this path. All the rayon farms, as well as the enterprises connected with them, such as the mixed feed plant, formed part of the local agricultural association. In fact, this was the prototype of the Pyarnu Agroindustrial Association, which officially operates as of 16 March 1979.

Correspondent: Permit me to be more specific. I am now talking not only with the present chairman of the Pyarnu Agroindustrial Association, but, in the same person, with the former deputy chairman of the Vil'yandi Agricultural Association...

A. Soasepp: It turned out so. Apparently, you know that Comrade Udam, our present first secretary of the rayon committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, was then first secretary in Vil'yandi. Well, in connection with the organization of the agroindustrial association of Pyarnuskiy Rayon he offered me a job in the managerial unit. I agreed. As practice has shown, this work is interesting and progressive.

Correspondent: What is the present structure of the Pyarnu Agroindustrial Association?

A. Soasepp: It has been greatly expanded as compared with the former Vil'yandi Agricultural Association. It includes farms of the Estonian SSR Ministry of Agriculture formerly subordinated to the rayon agricultural administration and, in addition to this, the Sindi Sovkhoz of the Administration of Poultry Raising Industry and the Tori and Vyandra sovkhozes of the Institute of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Science. It has the Audru Sovkhoz of the Estonian SSR Ministry of Fruit and Vegetable Industry, the Pyarnu Kalur Kolkhoz subordinate to the Administration of Fish Industry of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers and the four farm subordinate to the Estonian Republic Union of Consumer Societies. In general, we have all the 30 kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the rayon. Now look. The interfarm hog breeding farm; the interfarm peat association; the Scientific Production Association for Agrochemical Services to Agriculture; two agricultural equipment associations--Pyarnuskiy Rayon and Vyandraskiy Interrayon; two forestry farms--Pyarnu and Kilingi-Nymmeskiy--this is within the framework of the Estonian SSR Ministry; two offices of the Estonian Republic Union of Consumer Societies--Pyarnu and Kilingi-Nymmeska-ya; the interkolkhoz construction organization; the meat combine and dairy combine --this is from the Estonian SSR Ministry of Meat and Dairy Industry.

Correspondent: This is vast...

A. Soasepp: This may seem so. Our rayon is big. According to the map it measures 189 km from one end to the other. I would like to tell you that the association is not yet complete. For example, there is a shortage of transport organizations. We are raising the question of subordinating at least one column of the local motor pool to the agroindustrial association.

Correspondent: How is the agroindustrial association managed?

A. Soasepp: In the same way as the Vil'yandi Agricultural Association--by the association council. It includes the managers of all our farms, enterprises and organizations and, personally, the first secretary of the rayon party committee, the chairman of the rayon executive committee and the chairman of the rayon committee of the trade-union of agricultural workers.

Correspondent: And your subordination?

A. Soasepp: It is a double subordination, as in many rayon services. Territorially we are subordinate to the rayon executive committee and sectorially, to the Estonian SSR Ministry of Agriculture.

Correspondent: Now is as good a time as any to turn to your practice. Its results for the national economy are well known. In 2 years the growth of meat production in the rayon amounted to 2,400 tons and of milk, 7,000 tons. We know that such figures are not formed simply. Behind them there is the selfless labor of people, the mobilizing work of party organizations, the supply of equipment and mineral fertilizers and so forth. But let us try to single out from this "conglomerate" the steps taken by the association council.

A. Soasepp: I don't even know where to begin. This involved quite a significant set of measures and activities implemented almost simultaneously. Our leading idea was to provide more or less equal conditions of economic and social development for all farms. Several ways were possible. For example, differentiation of purchase prices. Weak farms would be paid more per quintal of meat or milk than strong farms. However, we rejected this right away. The subjective factor was too serious. It was possible to lower the plans for lagging farms by increasing them for advanced farms. We also rejected this as an obvious injustice. Following the experience of Vil'yandi we decided to act through the association's centralized funds.

Correspondent: Where are the funds from?

A. Soasepp: All the rayon farms were divided into five groups depending on quite a complex indicator derived by specialists--the coefficient of management efficiency. The provision with fixed capital and mineral fertilizers, the utilization of purchased concentrated feed, the quality index of soil, the availability of manpower and so forth were taken into consideration. Farms under the best conditions received the coefficient 1.5, those under slightly worse conditions, 1.25 and so down to 0.5. Next deductions into centralized funds were made--from 6 to 2 rubles per hectare of agricultural land respectively. Thus, we obtained quite an impressive sum--0.5 million rubles--which we distributed among the following funds: for development, for material incentives and for social-cultural measures and housing construction. There is even a reserve. The council decides how much to allocate to every farm.

Correspondent: How do you help?

A. Soasepp: The farm sends in an application, explaining why it needs the money. For example, in 1979 the Pyarnyye Sovkhoz asked money for bonuses for milkers and plowmen and for construction. It did not have its own money, because there was no profit. We examined the application at the council and allocated for all items 75,000 rubles and last year 16,000 rubles more. This was at the beginning of the year. By the end of 1980 this farm already had 324,000 rubles of profit and, according to preliminary estimates, this year it will receive 406,000. Of course, we did not merely give money. We replaced the management there. Yu. Simson, holder of the Order of Lenin, who is a good organizer, accepted the sovkhoz. As we see, the present situation is completely different. Now we have applications from the Suureyye Kolkhoz (last year we gave it money for the construction of a dryer) and from the Nymme and Tystamaa sovkhozes--all this for material incentives. We will help...

Correspondent: Outright?

A. Soasepp: Pyarnye is now able to return some of the money. We will accept it. In general, we may not demand it--this depends on the general results of management.

Correspondent: I understood you correctly. You help those who give an SOS signal.

A. Soasepp: Financial assistance is only one of many measures of influence. We also coordinate it. We face the problem of development of social and cultural life and domestic services in rural areas. Of course, ideally, every farm should have a club, nurseries with a kindergarten and perhaps even a school. However, there are not enough funds and, what is even more important, materials and forces of builders for all. Therefore, we are now planning regional development. We divided the entire rayon into nine regions. In each region farms form cooperatives. For example, nurseries are built in the most convenient point geographically. During the last 2½ years we have built nurseries in the Nymmeskiy Region (for three farms), the Vyandra Region (for three farms) and the Lypeskiy Region (also for three farms). We have also built Pyarnu Kalur and the Kolkhoz imeni V. I. Lenin.

Correspondent: Apparently, you adopted the same line in animal husbandry. I have in mind interfarm sections.

A. Soasepp: We must approach this very carefully. On the one hand, we are proud that in the interfarm hog section the expenditures per kg of meat are almost the lowest in the country--4.2 fodder units. By the way, as a result of this the indicator is also good in the rayon--only 5.2 units. But let us look at the whole picture. Let us assume that an interfarm section for 1,000 head of large-horned cattle was built. It is mechanized. Accordingly, labor expenditures are lower there. But these are direct expenditures. And indirect? Feed has to be transported from all farms. This is expensive. Organic fertilizers have to be carted out to distant fields. This is also expensive. Furthermore, will milkers want to travel over a distance of many kilometers to this remarkable section? If they move closer to it, this means that a new residential settlement will have to be built. The village where people lived from time immemorial will begin to weaken--women will have no work. I am not against complexes. This would be naive. But, as the saying goes, one must look before one leaps. For now--I repeat, for the present--we are not pushing this policy.

Correspondent: Ago Iokhannesovich, I have the impression that you are less concerned with advanced farms than with lagging ones. Is this correct?

A. Soasepp (laughing): Partly, although the immediate interest dictates: Give the advanced farm money for a cow barn, the yield will be both bigger and quicker. At one time, if you remember, there was such a policy. I believe that this policy is primarily responsible for the fact that rural areas have become impoverished of people. Now we want to rectify this situation and, therefore, we pay special attention to lagging farms. Nevertheless, you are only partly correct. We also try to provide incentives for advanced farms. For example, we introduced four challenge banners instead of two, that is, separately to kolkhozes and sovkhozes for animal husbandry and plant growing. Our banner means both a quarterly bonus to a farm amounting to 800 rubles and, if it is based on annual results, 1,200 rubles plus permission for the purchase of a private motor vehicle. You know, this is a big incentive...

Correspondent: We are discussing interesting things, but, you will agree, in one direction--farms and more farms. However, what is the effect on industry?

A. Soasepp: I must admit that we don't have full rights in this area. Of course, we don't encroach, for example, on the assortment plan of a meat combine or a dairy combine, or on the pursuance of a technical policy there, but we believe that their participation in the association's life should be wider. Here is a simple example. We established a bonus of 600 rubles for victory in the rayon competition for our enterprises. Not bad? We try to help them in work--both with equipment and people, if necessary. But so far they have been so-called functional members of our association and do not deduct money into the centralized fund. Is this fair? The same meat combine, which is directly interested in deliveries, could deduct some specific funds, for example, for the construction of hog barns. But it cannot do so. The bank and the ministry did not give it such a right. We too have the right to award a bonus to the combine, but not to punish it. We can stir it to some activities only through the rayon party committee or the ministry. In my opinion, this is wrong. In general, in this respect our goal is to more interest all enterprises in the final product both morally and financially.

Correspondent: I know that this is a difficult year for you. There was incessant rain in Pyarnu.

A. Soasepp: On the basis of the results this year is not bad. But, of course, next year we will feel the shortage of grain crops and potatoes, so that, apparently, we will also need help...

Correspondent: The last question. Although our discussion concerned mainly "organizational problems," which certainly will also confront other agroindustrial associations in the republic, I would like to know your personal opinion of the psychological problems connected with work under the new conditions.

A. Soasepp: The question is clear. Yes, to be sure, the establishment of the agroindustrial association requires from the staff of the former agricultural administration (the agroindustrial association was established at its base) and especially from farm managers an understanding of the new situation and the ability to give up something for the common good and to subordinate the interests of their farm to the public benefit. This is a very complex test and, frankly speaking, some directors and chairmen did not pass it. There is nothing bad in this. We have examples when a certain director himself came and asked to be transferred to a less responsible position. Truthfully speaking, we ourselves suggested this decision to some. It couldn't be helped.

The establishment of agroindustrial associations is the most important stage in the implementation of the food program being worked out and in the country's economic and social development. These problems must be solved at the level of present requirements. This means creatively, that is, not blindly copying the experience of Pyarnuskiy or Vil'yandiskiy Rayons, but proceeding from local conditions and specific management plans. Perhaps it will also be necessary to establish a general republic council of agroindustrial associations. I believe that these kinds of decisions will fully correspond to both the line of the 26th congress of our party and to the decisions of the November (1981) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

REGIONAL

RAYON ASSIGNS REPAIR BRIGADES TO INDIVIDUAL FARMS

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Dec 81 p 2

/Article by A. Koptsov and S. Troyan, special correspondents of IZVESTIYA, Orlovskaya Oblast: "An Adjuster Came to the Farm"/

/Excerpts/ The Complex Is Seeking a Mechanic...

N. Korolev, deputy kolkhoz chairman:

"Animal husbandry begins with feed. This is a truth verified by century-old practice. However, if we take into consideration that milk production technology is being placed on an industrial basis to an ever greater extent, the productivity of the dairy herd also depends in large measure on the efficient operation of the most diverse machines and mechanisms with which cow barns are filled. I will cite a specific example of our management.

"We telephoned Sel'khoztekhnika and asked that fitters be sent. They did not come right away and did not always make repairs properly. We complained about Sel'khoztekhnika and it complained about us: 'Let them learn to operate equipment correctly.' This is how we lived until recently.

"Now there is a different situation. The specialized department assigned a permanent brigade to the kolkhoz. It repairs, checks and tests every mechanism in summer, when the herd is in camps, and observes the conditions and operation of equipment during the stabling period. If there is a breakdown, it is eliminated promptly."

Every Day Service

M. Poturoyev, first secretary of the Orlovskiy Rayon Party Committee:

"Not every shop of an industrial enterprise can be compared to the present farm in the complexity and diversity of equipment. However, whereas at a plant or factory there are adjusters and repair brigades, at a kolkhoz, sovkhoz and even rayon association for supply of production equipment for agriculture 'experienced people' service farms. This expression is interpreted among the people as follows: 'A skilled person is someone who was at a station once and at a mill once.'

"In our rayon there are more than 100 livestock breeding farms--dairy, hog raising and sheep breeding. They have 340 buildings. There are more than 230 milking installations alone. Well, what of that? A total of 19 out of 26 farms do not even have mechanics in labor intensive processes in animal husbandry. In the rayon association for supply of production equipment for agriculture two dozen fitters serviced the farms. By no means all of them were experts in their field.

"Six large mechanized complexes have been built in the rayon in the last few years. They are not cheap. However, farms are willing to incur expenses and will continue to do so. After all, a complex means overall mechanization of production processing, which facilitates the difficult labor of livestock breeders. A complex means a higher productivity and standard of labor. I remember that a strict order was given to the members of receiving commissions: Not to accept a complex even if one mechanism does not operate. The commissions acted in this way. However, time passed--and not a very long time at that--and on some 'giants,' as before, milkers milked cows with their hands and herdsmen distributed fodder with forks. Loads and service zones remained the same as before the 'complex' period. Moreover, continual reshuffling--sometimes mechanical and sometimes manual milking--lowered the productivity of the dairy herd and traumatized the animals.

"Then we became firmly convinced that there was a need for a special service, which would constantly watch over the equipment of farms. We turned to the RSFSR State Committee for Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture. It supported our idea. It prepared a table of organization and allocated money. Thus, a specialized department for technical services for livestock breeding farms and complexes appeared in the rayon."

The Brigade Has "Its Own" Farm

Thus, a specialized department. Let us look what this is. On the territory of the rayon association for supply of production equipment for agriculture there are several low premises resembling garages. This is the so-called technical service station. A total of 28 brigades. There are five repair shops--milking installations, electric start protection equipment, refrigerating equipment, conveyors and vacuum pumps. There is also a set-up shop. It manufactures caps for vacuum pumps, branch pipes, nuts and other simple spare parts. Truthfully speaking, these small, for the most part semidark, primitively equipped premises can be called shops only conditionally. Nevertheless, this is a separate and special service! Permanent brigades assigned to specific kolkhozes and sovkhozes are the vivid distinction and indisputable advantage of the new technical services for livestock breeding farms. They are small, consisting only of four people, that is, a fitter-driver of a mobile shop ("flying squad"), an electrician, a sanitary engineer and a gas-arc welder.

G. Perepelitsa, chief of the specialized department:

"Do you know how many people engaged in farm mechanization in the Rayon Sel'khoz-tehnika Association 2 years ago? Only... 18. When stabling began, so did the telephone calls: 'We are milking cows manually,' 'livestock has not been watered,' 'conveyors are not operating--they got stuck in manure...' We began to find out why fitters did not depart, but repairmen had their complaints: 'We put a milk

line into operation on this kolkhoz a week ago. It has already been broken. If it is operated in such an incompetent way, no iron will withstand this.' But today in our department there are about 200 animal husbandry mechanization specialists. This alone will enable us to much better service kolkhozes and sovkhozes. After all, we have established permanent brigades for every farm.

"Incidentally, previously there were also brigades. Of course, not enough--only six. But they operated according to the principle of 'putting out the fire.' Sometimes one, sometimes another and sometimes still another brigade went to a farm. It was difficult to determine, for example, why a conveyer broke down so often. Was it because of inefficient repairs or incompetent operation? As a rule, the guilty persons were not found.

"Now a brigade services the same, 'its own,' kolkhoz or sovkhoz. Of course, there are situations when it goes to other farms and helps colleagues. But its main duty is to ensure a regular operation of farm mechanization on the kolkhoz or sovkhoz assigned to it. Permanent work on a farm enabled brigades to get to know the conditions of production, the equipment of farms, its technical state and weak links. Such 'guardianship' increased--which is very important--the responsibility and personal interest of animal husbandry mechanization specialists in a regular operation of equipment.

"In 2 years brigades sorted out 226 conveyers, not waiting for them to break down. They established technical service centers at large farms and complexes. How did they establish them? Very simply. They asked farm managers to allocate small premises, installed fitters' benches, made shelves and laid out the tools and spare parts needed most often. All this made it possible to raise the quality and to shorten the time of repair work. Moreover, the number of breakdowns decreased. Now brigades, one can say, face a totally different task than before, that is, not so much of efficiently and quickly eliminating breakdowns as of avoiding them and preventing failures."

How To Interest the Partner

If we approach the evaluation of the activity of the specialized department more strictly, we will see that not everything is going the way both farms and the workers of the new service themselves would wish. Not all animal husbandry mechanization specialists have high skills and practical experience. Personnel turnover is still considerable. The production base is weak.

As is well known, however, time is the strictest judge. In principle, it is for the new organization of technical services for farms. The very fact that in the rayon there is a service that constantly engages in the mechanization of production processes in animal husbandry and investigates its problems deserves all possible attention and approval. In 2 years the department was able to raise the standard of labor of livestock breeders and to provide more farms with mechanical milking, mechanical fodder distribution, automatic drinking bowls and conveyers for barn cleaning. The quality of livestock products also improved. Now the rayon farms will sell 11 percent more first-grade milk to the state than 2 years ago. The department workers also contributed to this. They ensured a regular operation of milk cooling installations, changed and washed milking apparatus regularly--in summer three times a month--and cattle yards became cleaner. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes also spend less money on the repair and technical servicing of equipment.

The workers of the specialized department will begin to even better engage in the mechanization of animal husbandry and in the technical servicing of farms when they are responsible for their work morally, as well as materially, when their wages are made directly dependent on the final results--the quantity and quality of livestock products produced on a kolkhoz or sovkhоз. Ways of solving this problem are also being sought in the rayon. Measures have been taken to strengthen the production base of the department. The construction of three spacious and bright buildings will begin in the south-western outskirts of the city of Orel next year. This means that the new service will grow, gather strength and raise the level and standard of technical services for livestock breeding farms and complexes.

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